C. J. Temminck, director of the Rijksmuseum van Natuurlijke Historie and a renowned ornithologist, gained his contemporary's respect thanks to the description of many new species and to his detailed monographs on birds. He also published a small number of works on biogeography describing the fauna of the Dutch colonies in South East Asia and Japan. These works are remarkable for two reasons. First, in them Temminck accurately described the species composition of poorly explored regions, like the Sunda Islands and (...) Japan. Secondly, he formulated a new law on the geographical distribution of animals around the globe, based on the parallels he observed between the fauna from Europe, Asia and Japan. The underlying ideas that lead Temminck to this law were the typeconcept, which he understood as the ideal morphological plan behind animal form, the unchanging character of the species and a strong belief in nature's divine design. During the first half of the nineteenth century, the type-and the species-concept, the origin and fixity of the species and the meaning of variations aroused heated discussions. When put in the context of his time, Temminck emerges as a scientist whose work was driven by the dominating scientific philosophy of the time in which he lived, under the influence of late eighteenth century natural history and of French empiricists, in particular, the great zoologist and paleontologist Georges Cuvier. Temminck's detailed descriptions of the Dutch East Indian fauna helped the great naturalists after him to understand nature's patterns and to propose comprehensive theories that explain its diversity. (shrink)

This reconsideration of Hume’s classic essay “Of Miracles” via the lens of American pragmatist ways of thinking about history and power shifts our attention from Hume’s epistemic concerns about the legitimacy of witnesses and testimony to his distaste for sacred history, his critical stance regarding the social force of revelation, and his disdain for religious authority. To view Hume’s essay both as an articulation of a critical philosophy of history and as an exercise in moral dynamism (social power or, authority, (...) is a result of epistemic transactions), is to intervene in both Hume studies and Contemporary Pragmatism. (shrink)

C. J. Temminck, director of the Rijksmuseum van Natuurlijke Historie (now the National Museum of Natural History in Leiden) and a renowned ornithologist, gained his contemporary's respect thanks to the description of many new species and to his detailed monographs on birds. He also published a small number of works on biogeography describing the fauna of the Dutch colonies in South East Asia and Japan. These works are remarkable for two reasons. First, in them Temminck accurately described the species composition (...) of poorly explored regions, like the Sunda Islands and Japan. Secondly, he formulated a new law on the geographical distribution of animals around the globe, based on the parallels he observed between the fauna from Europe, Asia and Japan. The underlying ideas that lead Temminck to this law were the typeconcept, which he understood as the ideal morphological plan behind animal form, the unchanging character of the species and a strong belief in nature's divine design. During the first half of the nineteenth century, the type-and the species-concept, the origin and fixity of the species and the meaning of variations aroused heated discussions. When put in the context of his time, Temminck emerges as a scientist whose work was driven by the dominating scientific philosophy of the time in which he lived, under the influence of late eighteenth century natural history and of French empiricists, in particular, the great zoologist and paleontologist Georges Cuvier. Temminck's detailed descriptions of the Dutch East Indian fauna helped the great naturalists after him to understand nature's patterns and to propose comprehensive theories that explain its diversity. (shrink)

In this paper, I draw out a tension between miracles, prophecy, and Spinoza’s assertions about Moses in the Theological-Political Treatise (TTP). The three seem to constitute an inconsistent triad. Spinoza’s account of miracles requires a naturalistic interpretation of all events. This categorical claim must therefore apply to prophecy; specifically, Moses’ hearing God’s voice in a manner which does not seem to invoke the imagination or natural phenomena. Thus, Spinoza seemingly cannot maintain both Moses’ exalted status and his account of miracles. (...) I consider some possible solutions, but find that they are either untrue to Spinoza’s position, or would undercut his categorical argument against miracles. I therefore conclude that Spinoza leaves an unresolved tension in the TTP. (shrink)

General preface -- Preface to the second edition -- What is philosophy of religion? -- Philosophy of religion and other disciplines -- Philosophy of religion and philosophy -- Can thinking about religion be neutral? -- Fideism -- Neutralism -- Critical dialogue -- The theistic God : the project of natural theology -- Concepts of God -- The theistic concept of God -- A case study : divine foreknowledge and human freedom -- The problem of religious language -- Natural theology -- (...) Proofs of God's existence -- Classical arguments for God's existence -- Ontological arguments -- Cosmological arguments -- Teleological arguments -- Moral arguments -- Conclusions: The value of theistic argument -- Religious experience -- Types of religious experience -- Models for understanding experience -- Experience of God as direct and mediated -- Are religious experiences veridical? -- Checking experiential claims -- Special acts of God : revelation and miracles -- Special acts -- Theories of revelation -- Is the traditional view defensible? -- What is a miracle? -- Is it reasonable to believe in miracles? -- Can a revelation have special authority? -- Religion, modernity, and science -- Modernity and religious belief -- Naturalism -- Do the natural sciences undermine religious belief? -- Objections from the social sciences -- Religious uses of modern atheism -- The problem of evil -- Types of evil, versions of the problem, and types of response -- The logical form of the problem -- The evidential form of the problem -- Horrendous evils and the problem of hell -- Divine hiddenness -- Faith(s) and reason -- Faith : subjectivity in religious arguments -- The evidentialist challenge to religious belief -- Reformed epistemology -- The place of subjectivity in forming beliefs -- Interpretive judgments and the nature of a cumulative case -- Can faith be certain? -- Faith and doubt : can religious faith be tested? -- What is faith? -- Could one religion be true? (shrink)

Once we accept anyone's postulates he becomes our professor and our god: for his foundations he will grab territory so ample and so easy that, if he so wishes, he will drag us up to the clouds. Montaigne During the last fifteen years, the community of philosophers interested in religion has evinced a waxing concern with the justificatory value of religious experiences for theism. Two parallel but largely discrete debates have appeared in the literature.

This volume collects 12 essays by various contributors on the subject of the importance and influence of Schopenhauer’s doctoral dissertation for both Schopenhauer’s more well-known philosophy and the ongoing discussion of the subject of the principle of sufficient reason. The contributions deal with the historical context of Schopenhauer’s reflections, their relationship to idealism, the insights they hold for Schopenhauer’s views of consciousness and sensation, and how they illuminate Schopenhauer’s theory of action. This is the first full-length, English volume on Schopenhauer’s (...) Fourfold Root and its relevance for Schopenhauer’s philosophy. The thought-provoking essays collected in this volume will undoubtedly enrich the burgeoning field of Schopenhauer-studies. (shrink)

1. HUME’S ARGUMENT, FLEW CORRECTLY EXPLAINS, IS NOT THAT MIRACLES CANNOT HAPPEN, BUT THAT THERE MUST BE A CONFLICT IN THE EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT THEY DO. 2. (I) FLEW FURTHER APPEALS TO THE INHERENT WEAKNESS OF HISTORICAL AS OPPOSED TO SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE. BUT ONE’S ASSESSMENT OF THE EVIDENCE MUST DEPEND ON WHETHER THE CONCEPT IS POSSIBLE. (II) FLEW CLAIMS THAT HUME CAN BE TAKEN TO MEAN THAT WHAT IS ALLOWED TO BE A LOGICAL POSSIBILITY SHOULD YET BE DISMISSED AS (...) IMPOSSIBLE IN FACT. BUT THIS DISTINCTION CANNOT BE APPLIED IN ADVANCE OF AN OCCURRENCE, WITHOUT BEGGING THE QUESTION AS TO WHETHER IT IS INDEED POSSIBLE OR NOT. 3. PACE HUME AND FLEW, ENTERTAINING THE CONCEPT IS NOT INCOHERENT. FOR (I) THE RELEVANT "LAW OF NATURE" CAN BE THOUGHT OF AS POTENTIALLY APPLICABLE, THOUGH NOT IN FACT SO; (II) ONE MAY CONCEIVE OF AN "UNCAUSED" EVENT, ONCE ONE SUPPOSES THAT IN MOST OTHER CASES THE UNIVERSE IS UNIFORM. THUS IT COULD BE RATIONAL TO JUDGE THAT A MIRACLE HAD OCCURRED, SINCE THIS WOULD NOT CAL. (shrink)

THERE ARE TWO CONCEPTS OF MIRACLE: AS (A) THE VIOLATION OF A NATURAL LAW, AND AS (B) A STRIKING COINCIDENCE WITHIN NATURAL LAW. DIFFICULTIES IN (A) HAVE BEEN WIDELY DISCUSSED, E.G., BY R SWINBURNE. THOSE IN (B) HAVE NOT. I ARGUE THAT IF DIFFICULTIES IN (A) FORCE A RETREAT TO (B), THEN A PLACE MUST BE FOUND FOR A GOD TO ACT TO PRODUCE (B). SEVERAL POSSIBILITIES ARE CONSIDERED; NONE ARE FOUND SATISFACTORY EXCEPT POSSIBLY THE GOD INFLUENCING UNNOTICED AN (...) ANIMATE OBJECT. I CONCLUDE WITH A NEW AND FAVORABLE LOOK AT HUME’S CONTRARY MIRACLES ARGUMENT. (shrink)

This essay characterises applied philosophy of religion as a certain sort of engagement with what religion means in the private and public lives of its practitioners. After emphasising continuities with the past, such as Hume's critique of miracles and Hobbes and Spinoza's discussions of scriptural meanings, it then discusses John Cottingham's recent work on spirituality and religious sensibility, followed by a section on new explorations of religious epistemology citing Linda Zagzebski's work on individual and communal epistemic authority, and Leonore Stump's (...) elaboration of a form of non‐propositional knowledge gained from narrative. Debates about the role of religion in liberal democratic politics are then addressed, with special attention to the contentious idea of a religion‐free “secular” or “public” reason as advocated respectively by Robert Audi and John Rawls. The significance of interdisciplinary input for dispelling religious stereotypes leads to a discussion of common gaps between proclamations of religious leaders and the sincere religious beliefs of their flocks. A section follows on the complex idea of religious experience, before the essay concludes with an account of relevant issues in religious ethics. (shrink)

Scientists routinely solve the problem of supplementing one’s store of variables with new theoretical posits that can explain the previously inexplicable. The banality of success at this task obscures a remarkable fact. Generating hypotheses that contain novel variables and accurately project over a limited amount of additional data is so difficult—the space of possibilities so vast—that succeeding through guesswork is overwhelmingly unlikely despite a very large number of attempts. And yet scientists do generate hypotheses of this sort in very few (...) tries. I argue that this poses a dilemma: either the long history of scientific success is a miracle, or there exists at least one method or algorithm for generating novel hypotheses with at least limited projectibility on the basis of what’s available to the scientist at a time, namely a set of observations, the history of past conjectures, and some prior theoretical commitments. In other words, either ordinary scientific success is miraculous or there exists a logic of discovery at the heart of actual scientific method. (shrink)

ONE OF HUME’S ARGUMENTS IN "OF MIRACLES" CONCLUDES (A) THAT MIRACLES IN DIFFERENT RELIGIONS ARE CONTRARY FACTS, AND (B) THAT ANY MIRACLE IN FAVOR OF ONE RELIGION IS EVIDENCE AGAINST ALL OTHERS. I ARGUE THAT WHILE (A) IS ABSURD, (B) IS APPLICABLE TO CHRISTIANITY IN VIRTUE OF ITS EXCLUSIVIST CLAIMS. IT WAS ACCEPTED BY THE EARLY FATHERS AND STILL HAS TO BE ASSUMED BY ALL BUT THE MOST DIFFIDENT CHRISTIANS.

We investigate whether there can be scientific truth if this truth depends ’inter alia’ on a true causal principle and if the principle strictly implies ’nature’s God’ ’qua’ a ’first cause’. If there is this ’cause’, then how does one know whether it or a natural cause was the cause of a phenomenon? Responses to this question involve examining critiques of the causal principle by Hume and Kant as well as by distinguishing logical from physical possibilities.

This paper explores the important role authority plays in the religious thought of Søren Kierkegaard. In contrast to dominant modes of thought in both modern and postmodern philosophy, Kierkegaard considers the religious authority inherent in a special revelation from God to be the fundamental source of religious truth. The question as to how a genuine religious authority can be recognized is particularly difficult for Kierkegaard, since rational evaluation of authorities could be seen as a rejection of that authority in favor (...) of the authority of reason. However, I argue that Kierkegaard does offer criteria for recognizing a genuine religious authority. I explore these criteria and try to show they are helpful, but I argue that there is no principled reason he should not accept other criteria he rejects, such as the criterion of miracles. In conclusion, I suggest that both the criteria offered by Kierkegaard and the method by which they are derived require us to question certain Enlightenment views as to what should count as “rational.”. (shrink)

THE AUTHOR ARGUES THAT THE HUMEAN "A PRIORI" ATTACK ON MIRACLES IS INTENDED TO SHOW THE INCOHERENCE OF THE NOTION OF A WELL-ATTESTED MIRACULOUS EVENT (NOT THE INCOHERENCE OF THE CONCEPT OF A MIRACLE). THOUGH THIS TYPE OF ATTACK CAN BE PRESENTED IN A POWERFUL FORM, IT SUFFERS FROM AN UNDULY NARROW ASSUMPTION CONCERNING THE NATURE OF EVIDENCE AND EXPLANATION, FOR IT "IS" POSSIBLE TO DESCRIBE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH IT WOULD BE REASONABLE TO CONCLUDE THAT A MIRACLE HAS (...) OCCURRED. HOWEVER, WE CAN KNOW ON "A POSTERIORI" GROUNDS THAT THE PROBABILITY OF THESE CIRCUMSTANCES EVER HAVING OBTAINED IS EXTREMELY REMOTE. FINALLY, IT IS ARGUED THAT (UNLESS THE DESIGN ARGUMENT IS SOUND) WELL-ATTESTED MIRACLES ARE, NEVERTHELESS, THE ONLY POSSIBLE GROUNDS WHICH COULD JUSTIFY A REASONABLE BELIEF IN THE EXISTENCE OF A PERSONAL GOD. (shrink)

Michel de Montaigne begins his magisterial ESSAIS by telling his readers that he, himself, is the matter of his book. He says that he has written himself so that after death he could remain in the world with those who knew and loved him. Montaignes intimate project, meant to be read by friends, has emerged as one of the most surprising and compelling accounts of the human condition ever written. Although Montaigne famously retired from public life to write his essais, (...) neither his concerns nor the activities recounted in ESSAIS is purely private. This volume of essays, based on papers presented at The A.V. Elliott Conference for Great Books and Ideas sponsored by Mercer Universitys McDonald Center for Americas Founding Principles, focuses on the outward oriented political philosophy of Montaigne. Contributors include Ann Hartle, Daniel Cullen, Christine Henderson, Eduardo Velasquez, Kevin Honeycutt, and Christopher Edelman. (shrink)

"Hume and Miracles" relates Hume’s essay "Of Miracles" to the Port-Royal ’Logic’ and John Locke. It argues that Hume did not, as is often supposed, intend to suggest that well-attested miracle reports defeat themselves by undermining the laws of nature they defy. Instead, Hume argues that the specifically ’religious’ nature of the testimony relating to miracle claims rules out their acceptance because of the frequency of fraud in religious matters. Hume’s views are too austere because one might wish (...) to reject the religious interpretation of an anomaly while accepting that the anomaly occurred. (shrink)

Here we interact critically with the volume The Miracle Myth: Why Belief in the Resurrection and the Supernatural Is Unjustified by University of Wisconsin philosopher Lawrence Shapiro, who contends that even if miracles occur, proper epistemological justification is unattainable. In addition, he argues that the historical evidence for Jesus’s resurrection is deeply problematic. We engage Shapiro’s philosophical and historical arguments by raising several significant issues within his own arguments, while also briefly providing some positive reasons to think that if (...) a miracle did occur, one may be epistemologically justified in believing it. (shrink)

Previous research conducted in 1999 highlighted ethical concerns behind challenge studies inducing psychosis with ketamine and made recommendations to enhance ethical standards. Recently, a plethora of clinical trials have evaluated the efficacy of ketamine to treat mood disorders, which lead to complex ethical issues. Pharmaceutical companies and researchers hope to profit by developing patentable variations on ketamine for treating depression. Media have labeled ketamine as a “miracle” antidepressant. Some clinics offer expensive off-label use of ketamine to treat mood disorders. (...) This article examines the ecological validity of ketamine trials, measures to protect patients, informed consent procedures, financial inducements to participants and conflict of interest of researchers, therapeutic misconception, concealment, and deception. Further recommendations are purposed to improve ethical standard of clinical research involving ketamine. (shrink)

Significant challenges arise for clinical care teams when a patient or surrogate decision-maker hopes a miracle will occur. This article answers the question, “How should clinical bioethicists respond when a medical decision-maker uses the hope for a miracle to orient her medical decisions?” We argue the ethicist must first understand the complexity of the miracle-invocation. To this end, we provide a taxonomy of miracle-invocations that assist the ethicist in analyzing the invocator's conceptions of God, community, and (...) self. After the ethicist appreciates how these concepts influence the invocator's worldview, she can begin responding to this hope with specific practices. We discuss these practices in detail and offer concrete recommendations for a justified response to the hope for a miracle. (shrink)

In this paper I explore Peter van Inwagen’s conception of miracles and the implications of this conception for the viability of his version of the natural law defense. I argue that given his account of miraculous divine action and its parallel to free human action, it is implausible to think that God did not prevent natural evil in our world for the reasons van Inwagen proposes. I conclude by suggesting that on the grounds he provides for “epistemic humility” about modal (...) claims and value judgments “unrelated to the concerns of everyday life,” the theist should simply embrace skeptical theism and not further attempt to construct a defense of God’s permission of evil. (shrink)

Is the view supported that consciousness is a mysterious phenomenon and cannot succumb, even with much effort, to the standard methods of cognitive science? The lecture, using the analogy of the magician’s praxis, attempts to highlight a strong but little supported intuition that is one of the strongest supporters of this view. The analogy can be highly illuminating, as the following account by LEE SIEGEL on the reception of her work on magic can illustrate it: “I’m writing a book on (...) magic”, I explain, and I’m asked, “Real magic?” By real magic people mean miracles, thaumaturgical acts, and supernatural powers. “No”, I answer: “Conjuring tricks, not real magic”. Real magic, in other words, refers to the magic that is not real, while the magic that is real, that can actually be done, is not real magic. I suggest that many, e.g., DAVID CHALMERS has perpetrated the same feat of conceptual sleight-of-hand in declaring to the world that he has discovered “The Hard Problem” of consciousness. It is, however, possible that what appears to be the Hard Problem is simply the large bag of tricks that constitute what CHALMERS calls the Easy Problems of Consciousness. These all have mundane explanations, requiring no revolutions in physics, no emergent novelties. I cannot prove that there is no Hard Problem, and CHALMERS cannot prove that there is. He can appeal to your intuitions, but this is not a sound basis on which to found a science of consciousness. The “magic” of consciousness, like stage magic, defies explanation only so long as we take it at face value. Once we appreciate all the non-mysterious ways in which the brain can create benign “userillusions”, we can begin to imagine how the brain creates consciousness. (shrink)

Miracle in a strict sense is to be discriminated from acts of special providence by its being radically unnatural in terms of prior expectation. The key issue in relation to credibility is theological in character, inasmuch as divine consistency must imply that miracles are capable of being understood as “signs,” affording deeper insight into the divine care for creation. These issues are explored by reference to scriptural miracles, particularly the virginal conception and the resurrection of Christ.

This book redefines our interpretation of Iamblichus' theurgy and religiosity, as revealed in his only complete surviving work, the De Mysteriis. Clarke argues that the existence and operation of the supernatural, or the miraculous, is the sine qua non of this work, and yet this is often overlooked by Iamblichus' philosophical interpreters. The argument is developed through the examination of numerous religious practices described by Iamblichus, most importantly those of animal sacrifice, oracular consultation, divine possession, and the ritual observation of (...) the luminous divine epiphanies. The book seeks to understand Iamblichus' position within the framework of, rather than through the eyes of, other Neoplatonists. Emma Clarke is the chief editor of the only modern English translation of the De Mysteriis, and in this book she breaks new ground in a growing area of interest, Neoplatonism. (shrink)

If one is interested in reasoning counterfactually within a physical theory, one cannot adequately use the standard possible world semantics. As developed by Lewis and others, this semantics depends on entertaining possible worlds with miracles, worlds in which laws of nature, as described by physical theory, are violated. Van Fraassen suggested instead to use the models of a theory as worlds, but gave up on determining the needed comparative similarity relation for the semantics objectively. I present a third way, in (...) which this similarity relation is determined from properties of the models contextually relevant to the truth of the counterfactual under evaluation. After illustrating this with a simple example from thermodynamics, I draw some implications for future work, including a renewed possibility for a viable deflationary account of laws of nature. (shrink)

À propos du livre récent de Marlène Albert Llorca, Les Vierges miraculeuses, l’auteur survole rapidement les conclusions de recherches récentes sur l’image religieuse dans l’Europe traditionnelle. Il examine les manières dont les dévots convertissent des images en objets cultuels en les associant à des laïcs importants et aux sanctuaires qui les accueillent. Il commente les conclusions d’Albert Llorca selon lesquelles ces images, vêtues pour la circonstance, peuvent servir à répliquer le “miracle” originel pour les dévots qui manipulent ces vêtements (...) ; ainsi se rejouent les événements miraculeux censés être à l’origine du charisme de l’image. C’est donc l’imaginaire de la communauté, incarné dans les “cameraras” qui habillent l’image, qui dote celle-ci de pouvoirs miraculeux. (shrink)

On the basis of both philosophical arguments and the theological perspectives of Eastern Orthodox Christianity, a critique of two beliefs that are common within the mainstream science–theology dialogue is outlined. These relate to critical realism in understanding language usage and to naturalistic perspectives in relation to divine action. While the naturalistic perspectives on the history of the cosmos that are predominant within the dialogue are seen as generally acceptable from an Orthodox perspective, it is argued that they require theological expansion. (...) This expansion suggests an understanding other than the “causal joint” model commonly adopted in relation to “special” divine action. This alternative model renders the distinction between “special” and “general” divine action redundant, and is based on what has been called a “teleological-Christological” understanding of the cosmos, rooted in the fourth gospel's notion of the divine Logos. The relevance of this critique to scholars outside of the Orthodox community is urged. (shrink)

This anthology includes 75 articles in nine areas of philosophy of religion. These areas include: traditional arguments for the existence of God; on the validity of religious experience; the problem of evil and other atheological arguments; the attributes of God; miracles and revelation; death and immortality; faith and reason; religious pluralism; and ethics and religion. The articles are arranged in a coherent framework, with the presentation of each area progressing from the classical to the contemporary and treated in a dialectic (...) (pro and con) fashion. (shrink)

The most comprehensive text in its field, this anthology includes 74 articles in 9 areas of philosophy of religion: The Concept of God; Traditional Arguments for the Existence of God; Religious Experience; The Problem of Evil; Miracles, Death and Immortality; Faith and Reason; Science, Religion, and Evolution; and Religious Pluralism. The arrangement of the articles and the introductions which accompany them help students place the readings in their historical or contemporary context, and to ensure that students can be exposed to (...) a spectrum of viewpoints. (shrink)